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MICHIGAN

LAW REVIEW
Vor,. XX

MARCH,

1922

No. 5

THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 1920-1921, V 1

VIII.
I.

JurusnrcTION AND PROCEDURE oF CouRTs2

The E.xtent of Federal litdicial Power

(a) Cases Arising under the Constitution or Laws of the United
States.
The question whether a case presents a "federal question,'' so
called, is raised in a number of the controversies in which the
1

For the preceding instalments, see 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. I-23, I35-I72, 26!288, 38I-4o6 (November, I92I-February, 1922).
2 Various aspects of judicial review of thq constitutionality of legislation
are considered in Orrin N. Carter, "Constitutional Decisions of Justice Cartwright," IS ILL. L. REv. 237; Robert Eugene Cushman, "Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court," 19 MICH. L. REv. 771, and "Marshall and the Constitution," 5 MINN. L. Rl;v. I; W. F. Dodd, "Presentation
of Constitutional Questions in Illinois,'' 3 ILL. L. Buu,. III; F. W. Grinnell,
"Some Forgotten History About the Duty of Courts in· Dealing with Unconstitutional Legislation," 54 Al.ntR. L. REv. 419; Wm. H. Lloyd, "Pylkington's
Case and Its Successors,'' 6g U. PA. L. REv. 20; Fred A. Maynard, "Five to
Four Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States," 54 AM:ER. L.
Ri;v. 481; Francis Newton Thorpe, "Hamilton's Ideas in Marshall's Decisions," I BosroN U. L. R:Ev. 60; John Barker Waite, "Public Policy and Personal Opinion," 19 MrcH. L. REv. 265; and notes in 21 CoLUM. L. R:Ev. 288
on jurisdiction to pass on constitutionality of initiatory petition, in 34 HARV.
L. Ri;v. 86 on what persons are entitled to raise the issue of unconstitutionality, and in 5 MINN. L. Ri;v. 81 on whether court can review legislative
declaration that law is an emergency measure not subject to referendum.
For discussion of declaratory judgments, see Edwin M. Borchard, "The
Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments,'' 34 HARV. L. REv. 6g7; W. F. Dodd,
"Michigan Declaratory Judgment Decision," 6 A. B. A. JouR. 145; Maurice
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asserted federal question was considered and answered. Only a
few of these instances need special mention. In Hartford Life Ins.
Co. v. Blincoe,3 after reversal by the Supreme Court of a state
judgment against a· defendant, a second judgment was rendered
by the state court on different grounds. These included holding
an assessment on an insurance policy to be void for the inclusion
of a state ta..x not legally due. On the second advent of the case to
the Supreme Court it was held that no federal question was presented by the state decisio1:1 as to the amount of the tax or on the
issue whether the company was doing business on the assessment
or the premium plan. In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. McGrew Coal
Co.4 the refusal of a state court, in a suit founded on a state longand short-haul statute, to dismiss the action of the shipper because
he did not pay the freight and was not damaged, was held to raise
no substantial federal question, but only a question of state law
which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review. In Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry. Co. v. Washbum Coal Co. 6 a state
judgment denying a carrier an action against a shipper for freight
in excess of the statutory rate subsequently declared confiscatory
was affirmed on the theory that it rested on grounds of contract
law which raised no federal question so long as the state court did
not sustain the statutory rate as valid. In Bullock v. Florida6 a
state decision that a railroad may not abandon operations without
the consent of the state was held to raise a federal question, but
E. Harrison, "California Legislation 0£ I92I Providing for Declaratory
Relief," 9 CALIF. L. REv. 359; James Schoonmaker, "Declaratory Judgment,"
5 MINN. L. REv. 32, I72; ·and notes in 2I CoLUM. L. REv. I68, I9 MICH. L.
REv. 86, and 30 YALE L. J. I6I, 204. The duty to give advisory opinions is
treated in 34 HARV. L. REv. 673.
Special courts for special purposes are considered in Henry B. Higgins,
"A New Province for Law and Order," 34 HARV. L. REv. 105; H. W. Humble,
"The Court of Industrial Relations in Kansas," I9 MICH. L. REv. 675; Wil-.
liam Reynolds Vance, "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations with Its
Background," 30 YALE L. J. 456; Edward F. Waite, "Courts of Domestic
Relations," 5 MINN. L. REv. I6I; J. S. Young, "Industrial Courts with Special Reference to the Kansas Experiment," 5 MINN. L. REv. 39, I85, 353;
and a note in 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 90I on small claims courts
3 255 U. S. I29, 4I Sup. Ct. (I92I), 20 MICH. L. REv. 267.
"-256 U. S. I34 4I Sup. Ct. 404 (I92I).
G 254 U. S. 370, 4I Sup. Ct. I40 (I920), 20 MICH. L. REv. 282.
6 254 U.S. 5I3, 41 Sup. Ct. I93 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. REv. 286.
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the issue whether a state would be bound by a foreclosure decree
was declared to be purely a question of local law. In Marshall v.
New Y ork7 the issue whether a lien for taxes -given by the common
law of New York is a prerogative right or merely a rule of administration was held to be one of local law on which the federal courts
will accept as conclusive the decisions of the New York courts. On
the other hand, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ault8 held that in an
action against the director general of railroads in which the Act
of Congress permitting the application of state police laws was
construed not to include laws imposing a penalty, the question
whether a state provision is penal or compensatory is one of federal law and not of state law:
In the foregoing cases federal jurisdiction over the controversy
was not dependent solely on the particular issues mentioned. In
two cases, however, efforts to initiate proceedings in the federal
courts were frustrated for entire lack of federal jurisdiction. In
Vallely v. Northern, Fire & Marine Ins. Co:9 an insurance company
without objection on its part was adjudged a bankrupt by the district court. It was undisputed that the company was an insurance
company and that the bankruptcy law does not apply to insurance
companies. The Supreme Court held therefore that the case did
not arise under a law of the United States and that the district
court was without jurisdiction, differentiating the situation from ·
cases where the question is whether the bankrupt is chiefly engaged
in farming or whether there is diversity of citizenship, in which
cases there is jurisdiction to decide the question and in which an
erroneous decision may be binding if not appealed from.
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Unitm 10 was a proceeding to enjoin a labor union. References in the bill to the fact
that the contracts interfered with by the striking defendants were
for supplies for the United States government and involved interstate commerce were said by Mr. Justice Clarke to be "much too
casual and meager to give serious color to the claim now made that
the cause of action asserted is one arising under the laws of the
254 U. S. 380, 41 Sup. Ct. 143 (1920).
256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 593 (1921).
9 254 U. S. 348, 41 Sup. Ct. 116 (1920).
10 254 U. S. 77, 41 Sup. Ct. 39 (1920).
7

8
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United States," and the contention was characterized as "an afterthought" and plainly not in the mind of the writer of the bill of
complaint. Justices Pitney and McReynolds dissented, but without indicating whether it was on this issue or on the further holding
that jurisdiction did not exist on account of diversity of citizenship.
In Stark Brothers Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. Stark11 there
was federal jurisdiction to award damages for infringement of a
trademark registered under the Act of Congress to the extent that
such damages arose after notice to the infringer. This was held
to be the only cause of action arising under the federal statute so
that the district court was without jurisdiction to award damages
for infringement prior to such notice.
A suit against a federal reserve bank was held in American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank12 to be one arising under the
laws of the United States, since it has long been established that
this is the nature of a suit against a defendant incorporated by the
United States. As to the contention that the suit was not within
the Judicial Code of I9n, Mr. Justice Holmes remarked:
"The contrary is established, and the accepted doctrine is
intelligible at least since it is part of the plaintiff's case that
the def~ndant bank existed and exists as an entity capable of
committing the wrong alleged and of being sued. These facts
depend upon the laws of the United States."
Provisions in the Judicial Code making national banking associations, for the purposes of suit against them, citizens of the states
in which they are respectively located were held not to apply to
the federal reserve banks created after the Code was enacted.
There was difference of opinion in Smith v. Kansas City Title
& Trust Co.13 as to whether a suit to enjoin a state bank from
purchasing bonds issued by the federal farm loan banks was a suit
arising under the laws or Constitution of the United States. The
federal questions in the case were whether Congress had power to
create the farm loan banks and to exempt their assets from state
taxation. For himself and Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice
U. S. 50, 41 Sup. Ct. 221 (1921).
U. S: -, 41 Sup. Ct. 499 (1921).
13 255 U. S. ,r8o, 41 Sup. Ct. 243 ( 1921),

11 255

12 256

20

MICH. L. R.Ev. 18-20.
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Holmes insisted that the legality of the investment was material
only because made so by the state law creating the state bank and
restricting its powers of investment. The Missouri law therefore
, created the _cause of action and a suit cannot arise under any other
law than that which creates the cause of action. The federal law,
he continued, "must create at least a part of the cause of action by
its own force, for it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must
arise under the law of the United States." For the majority, Mr.
Justice Day invoked the broader principle that where it appears
from the bill "that the right to relief depends upon the construction
or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a
reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction under
this provision." He relied also on quotations from Chief Justice
Marshall that a case "may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States whenever its correct decision
depends upon a construction of either" and when "the title or right
set up by the party may be defeated by one construction of the
Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the
opposite construction."
Other issues of federal jurisdiction were wholly statutory or
depended on common law principles. Among them are the right
to award costs after the dispute has become moot,14 and such questions as whether the decision below is a final one,15 whether the
jurisdiction of the district court as a federal court was involved
so that there may be direct appeal to the Supreme Court,16 whether
under the mandate of the Supreme Court the district court may
retain jurisdiction,17 and whether under the Lever Act a district
court in passing on claims for the requisition of supplies sits as a
court of claims so that a direct writ of error lies from the Supreme
Court.18
4Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 522 (1921).
lG'Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35, 41 Sup. Ct. 405 (1921);
American Steel Foundries v. Whitehead, 256 U.S. 40, 41 Sup. Ct. 407 (1921).
16 De Rees v. Costaguta, 254 U. S. 166, 41 Sup. Ct. 6g (1920); Louie v.
•
United States, 254 U. S. 548, 41 Sup. Ct. 188 (1921).
17 Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co., 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct.
1

558 (1921).
18

United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 569 (1921).
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(b) Controversies between Citizens of Different States.
Federal jurisdiction was denied in Niles-Benient-Po_nd Co. v.
Iron Moitlders' Union,19 in which a New Jersey corporation sued
an Ohio corporation and Ohio members of a labor union, because
it appeared that the defendant Ohio corporation was completely
controlled by the plaintiff New Jersey corporation and that there
was no substantial controversy or "collision of interest" between
the two, so that on the basis of real interest the two corporations
should be aligned as plaintiffs, which would make one of the plaintiffs a citizen of the same state as the defendants. 20
An apparent if not real exception to the rule invoked in the preceding case is illustrated by Sitprenie Tribe of Ben Hitr v. Cauble. 21
This was a suit in the federal court to enjoin a state action by
Indiana citizens against an Indiana mutual benefit society. The
basis of the request for the injunction was that the matter in issue
had previously been concluded in a "class-suit" brought in the federal court by non-Indiana citizens against the Indiana society.
Jurisdiction of the present proceeding was sustained as ancillary
to the prior class-suit. The Indiana citizens contended that had
they really been parties to the prior suit federal jurisdiction on
account of diversity of citizenship would have been defeated, and
that the fact that it had been entertained established that they were
not necessary parties and therefore were not bound by the decree.
The court's rejection of the contention involves the holding that if
there is the requisite diversity of citizenship between the nominal
parties to a class suit, federal jurisdiction is not defeated because
other persons having identity of interest with the plaintiffs are citizens of the same state as the defendant even though the nominal
plaintiffs represent the interests of those not included so as to conclude them by- the result of the litigation. The situation involves
the dilemma that class suits fail in their purpose unless they bi~d
Note 10, supra. See 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 692.
•
In 20 Cor.UM. L. REv. 917 is a note on a case holding that an insane
person is not the real party in interest in a suit brought by his committee
and that therefore the citizenship of the latter and not of the former determines whether suit can be brought in the federal courts on account of diversity of citizenship.
21 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1921). See 21 Cor.ui.r. L. REv. 487 and
19 MrcH. L. REv. 759.
11>
20
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all members of the class, including those who are fellow citizens
of the defendant; and that dass suits can seldom be instituted in
the federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship if jurisdiction is defeated whenever any member of the class is a fellow
citizen of the defendant. Support for the choice of the horn seized
was found in a rule of the cour1l which appeared to authorize it and
in the inconvenience of the opposite result,
So far as the Constitution is concerned there is no limitation as
to the law which federal courts shall apply in controversies between
citizens of different states. Congress, however, has provided that,
subject to certain exceptions, the laws of the several states shall be
regarded as the rules of decision .in trials at common law, in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. In interpreting this provision decisions of a state court on questions of
"general jurisprudence" are not accepted by the federal courts as
conclusive evidence of the law of the state. In proceedings in
equity, which are not within the terms of the federal statute, federal courts assume even greater latitude in deciding for themselves
what is the law of the state. A striking instance of this appears
in Wells-Fargo & Co. v. Taylor. 22 This was a bill brought in a fed-"
eral court by reason of diversity of citizenship to enjoin a successful plaintiff in a state court from taking any steps to enforce his
state judgment. The plaintiff in the original action was an employee
of an express company and the defendant was the railroad held by
the state court to be responsible for his injury. The express company's interest in the matter was due to its obligation to indemnify
the railroad company. It comes into the federal court and gets an
injunction against enforcing the state judgment on the ground that
its employee had stipulated with it that he assumed the risk of
injury and that this stipulation makes it against equity and good
conscience for him to enforce a judgment obtained in disregard of
it, it being previously established that the federal statute prohibiting
the federal courts from granting injunctions to stay proceedings
in state courts does not apply to prevent the enforcement of judgments obtained against equity and good conscience. The stipulation which it was against equity and good oonscience to disregard
was one which the Federal Employers' Liability Act, if applicable,
22 254

U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93 (1920).
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would render of no effect. After holding that the Liability Act
does not apply to employees of express companies, since they are
not "common carriers by railroad," Mr. Justice Van Devanter
declares that "it follows that the act has no bearing on the liability
of either company or on the validity of the messenger's agreement."
This apparently negatives any implication that Congress had taken
over the regulation of liability for the injury in question so as to
preclude the further application of state law. . Mr. Justice Van
Devanter goes on to say that "there being no statute regulating the
subject, it is settled by the decisions of this court, and is i;;ecognized
in other jurisdictions, that the messenger's agreement was a valid
and binding contract." The decisions cited in support do not include
any from Mississippi, the state in which the offensive judgment
was rendered. The decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, seems
to mean that if a state court in affirming a state judgment applies
a common-law rule in the realm of general jurisprudence which is
not to the taste of the United States Supreme Court, the advantage
of the state judgment may be taken away by a federal court which
gets jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship at the suit
of an interested third party. If the decision means anything less
than this, the restriction is dependent upon elements in the situation
not adverted to in Mr. Justice Van Devanter's opinion.
( c) Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction.
The "settled rule" that "a contract for the complete construction
of a ship or supplying materials therefor is non-maritime and not
within the admiralty jurisdiction" was adduced in Thames Towboa,t
Co. v. The Francis McDonald 23 to justify the exclusion from that
jurisdiction of a suit on a contract for completing a ship after the
hull had been put into the water.
That the admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to suits in substance against a state was held in two cases. In re State of New
York (Petition of Walsh) 24 was a libel in reni against a ship owned
privately but chartered to the superintendent of public works of
New York, against whom the owners secured the issue of a monition. Against this monition the Supreme Court issued a prohibition
23 254

24 256

U. S. 242, 41 Sup. Ct. 65 ( 1920).
U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 588 (1921). See 21 Cor,uM. L. Riw. 718.
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on the ground that it was an attempt to bring an action in personam
in substance against the state. The contention that this result
enabled New York tOI impose its local law upon the admiralty jurisdiction to the detriment of the characteristic symmetry and uniformity of the rules of maritime law was answered by saying that
"it is not inconsistent with this principle to accord to the states,
which enjoy the prerogatives of sovereignty to the extent of being
exempt from litigation at the suit of individuals in all other judicial tribunals, a like exemption in the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." In re State of New York (The Queen City) 2 G
was a libel in rem. against a tug owned by the state. Mr. Justice
Pitney declared that "the principle so uniformly held to exempt the
property of municipal corporations employed for public and governmental purposes from seizure by admiralty process in rem applies
with even greater force to exempt public property of a state ui;ed
and employed for public and governmental purposes." 26
256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 592 ( 1921).
Four cases involving ships in which foreign governments claimed some
proprietary interest were treated as raising questions of the construction of
the federal statute defining jurisdiction in admiralty, without any suggestion that they might be without the jurisdiction possible under the Constitution. In re Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 609 (1921),
declined to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the district court from
libelling a ship owned by the Turkish government and used for commercial
purposes, giving as a reason that it is far from plain that there is absence
of jurisdiction, so that the issue would not be determined on application
for prohibition, since when the question of jurisdiction is doubtful the
granting or withholding of a writ of prohibition is discretionary. The same
attitude was taken in Ex Parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185 (1921),
commented on in 34 HARV. L. Rsv. 782, 16 ILL. L. Rsv. 247, and 6g U. PA.
L. Rsv. 385, in which private counsel for the British embassy sought a writ
of prohibition against a libel of a privately owned vessel alleged by him to
be an· admiralty transport in the service of the British government. While
Mr. Justice Van Devanter remarked that the British government is entitled
as of right to appear in the suit and raise the jurisdictional question, he
suggested that it is better practice to make the asserted immunity of the
vessel a subject of diplomatic representations so that the executive department may pass on the claim and make what it thinks the appropriate suggestion to the court In The Pesaro, 255 U. S. 216, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o8 (1921),
the district court had, on the suggestion of the Italian ambassador that the
ship in question was owned by his government, dismissed the libel. This
was held erroneous on the ground that the suggestion, to be entertained,
2G
26
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( d) Controversies between Two or More States.

New York v. New J ersey 21 was a suit to enjoin the pollution of the
waters of New York bay by the discharge of sewage. While it does
not appear that the defendant denied the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, the court takes pains to point out explicitly
that the jurisdiction obtains. After remarking that New York, for
the purpose of showing its right to maintain the suit, set forth an
agreement between it and New Jersey fixing the boundary between
the two states and giving to New York, to an extent agreed, exclusive jurisdiction over the waters of the Bay of Ne~v York, Mr.
Justice Clarke continues :
"But we need not inquire curiously as to the rights of the
state of New York derived from this compact, for, wholly
aside from it, and regardless of the precise location of the
boundary line, the right of the state to maintain such a suit
as is stated in the bill is very clear. The health, comfort
and prosperity of the people of the state and the value of
their property being gravely menaced, as it is averred that
they are by the proposed action of the defendants, the state
is the proper party to represent and defend such rights by
resort to the remedy of an original suit in this court under
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States."
While there was no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court, Mr.
Justice Clarke observed that such problems as the adjustment of
should come through official channels of the United States. The subsequent
decision of the district court is discussed in 35 HARv. L. REv. 330, 337. The
same issue was involved in The Carlo Poma, 255 U. S. 2I9, 41 Sup. Ct. 309
(I92I), but the action taken was to vacate the decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals and to remand the case to it with orders to dismiss the appeal
from the district court, since, the issue being one of jurisdiction, the only
appeal was direct to the Supreme Court. Several of the cases reviewed in
this paragraph are considered in J. Whitla Stinson, "The Requisitioned and
the Government-owned Ship," 20 MICH. L. REY. 407.
Other questions of admiralty jurisdiction are discussed in J. Whitla
Stinson, "Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the Courts of Great Britain, France and the United States," I6 Ir.r.. L. REv. I; and in a note in IS
!Lr.. L. REY. 465 on the enforcement in admiralty of a state statute giving
action for wrongful death.
2 7 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 492 (I92I).
See 35 HARV. L. REv. 322.
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disputes over sewage are more likely to be solved by wise cooperation between the states involved than by proceedings in any court,
however constituted. The court did not share New York's apprehension as to the danger of pollution and so denied the injunction,
but without prejudice to the filing of another bill.
Various aspects of boundary controversies were treated in 0 klahoma v. Texas, 28 Oklahoma v. Texas, 20 and Arkansas v. },[ississi.ppi,30 in none of which was there any issue as to the jurisdiction
of the court.
( e) Suits against a State or the United States.
The reasons why a state is exempt from suit are reviewed by
Mr. Justice Pitney in In re State of New York (Petition of
Walsh). 31 While the Eleventh Amendment in terms forbids only
suits in law or equity brought against a state by a citizen of another
state, this special wording "was the outcome of a purpose to set
aside the effect of the decision" in Chisholm v. Georgia; and in
Hans v. Louisiana "the court demonstrated the impropriety of construing the amendment so as to leave it open for citizens to sue
their own state in the federal courts; and it seems to us equally
clear that it cannot with propriety be construed to leave open a suit
against a state in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether
its own citizens or not." This, it is to be noted, goes no further
than to say that the Eleventh Amendment does not impliedly authorize the suits against a state that it fails explicitly to forbid. The
real basis of the decision holding a state entirely exempt from the
jurisdiction of the federal court is a general principle opposed to
the line of thought in Chisholm v. Georgia. As Mr. Justice Pitney
puts it:
"That a state may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted
by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain
256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. 420 ( 1921).
256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 539 (1921).
30 256 U. S. 28, 41 Sup. Ct. 444 ( 1921).
a1 Note 24 supra.
28

29
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a suit brought by private parties against a state without consent given; nor one· brought by citizens of another state, or
by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, because of the
Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own
citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the amendment is but an exemplification."
The question whether a suit is one against a state "is to be determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the
entire record." Suits against a state are "not confined to cases
where the suit will operate so as to compel the_ state specifically to
perform its _contracts," but include also "such as will require it to
make pecuniary satisfaction for any liability." In the case at bar the
superintendent of public works would be affected in his official
capacity and not otherwise and the effect of any decree "would
expend itself upon the people of the state of New York in their
public and corporate capacity." This decision was followed in
fa re State of New York (The Queen City),32 in which a writ of
prohibition was issued against a libel in reni against a ship owned
by the state.
In Port of .Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co. 33 a municipal corporation which had brought a suit in a state court to quiet title to a
parcel of land objected to removal of the case to the federal court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship because, as it contended,
the land in question was owned by the state, which was therefore
the real party in interest. To this the court answered that the
municipality has an independent financiai interest in the controversy,
that suit against it would not be prevented by the Eleventh Amendment, and that there is no occasion to consider what effect the judgment in the case would have upon the state's interest. Doubtless
this result was reached the more readily because the litigation on its
merits was decided in favor of the municipality.34
32

Note 25, supra.
255 U. S. 56, 4r Sup. Ct. 237 ( r92r).
3~ The holding on the main issue was that the rights acquired by a
grantee of the state in lands adjoining a waterway depend wholly upon state
law, and that the company's claim that it was entitled to continued access
to the waterway was unsupported by the law of the state of Washington.
33
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In the preceding cases it is recognized that suits against state
officers acting under an unconstitutional statute are not suits against
a state. This finds illustration in San Antonio v. San Antonio Pitblic Service Commission, 30 in which it is observed that a federal court
has jurisdiction to enjoin a rate prescribed by a state which is
admittedly confiscatory.
The same principle applies to suits against federal officers. In
Payne v. Central Pacific Ry. Co. 36 a suit to enjoin the secretary of
the interior from cancelling a selection of indemnity lands was held
not a suit against the United States when the selection is valid and
the secretary's threatened cancellation is based on a misconception
of his authority. So also in Kennington v. Palmer31 an injunction
restraining the attorney general from enforcing the, unconstitutional provisions of the Lever Act was ordered by the Supreme
Court after the lower court had dismissed the bill on the ground
that the· plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. That the suit
was not one against the United States was assumed without discussion, Chief Justice White contenting himself with saying that
"as it is no longer open to deny that the averments of unconstitutionality which were relied upon, if well founded, justified equitable
relief under their bill, and because the opinion in the Cohen case
has conclusively settled that they were well founded, it follows that
the court below was wrong." The cases adduced in support were
ones in which the Supreme Court had previously determined the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of statutes in proceedings to
enjoin officers from enforcing or threatening to enforce the criminal provisions of the law, but in which the propriety of the remedy
was not given explicit consideration by the Supreme Court. This
important method of securing an early adjudication of constitutional issues now receives explicit sanction.
The principle that the United States cannot be sued without its
consent is applied in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. AuU38 to reverse a
judgment against the director general of railroads for a penalty
provided by state law for delay in paying to an employee the wages
255 U. S. 547, 4I Sup. Ct. 428 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. :RIW. 28I.
U. S. 228, 4I Sup. Ct 3I4 (I92I).
37 255 U. S. IOO, 4I Sup. Ct. 303 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. RIW. 9.
38 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 593 (192I).
30
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due at the time of his discharge. The government had consented
to be sued and had provided that the lawful police regulations of
the states should continue unimpaired while the roads were under
federal control. Notwithstanding this, it was held that there was
nothing in the purpose or spirit of the act "to indicate that Congress
intended to authorize suit against the government for a penalty, if
it should fail to perform the legal obligation imposed." 30
2.

Requisites of Jwrisdiction Over Defe1idant

The railroad made defendant in Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Anderson-Tully Co. 40 objected that the district in which suit was
brought was not one "through which the road of the carrier runs"
within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act and that the
person on whom process was served was not its agent. On the
latter issue the return of the marshal was held conclusive in the
absence of any evidence to controvert it other than the stipulation
that the road was under federal control at the time. For all this,
says Mr. Justice Clarke, the person served might have been the
agent of the defendant as well as of the government. On the stat. utory issue of venue, the defendant was held to be running its road
in the district when it ran its cars therein over the line of another
road for which it paid on a mileage basis. This arrangement was
held to make it substantially a lessee.41

3. Procedural Requirements
An ancient Delaware statute which prevented non-residents from
defending on the merits suits begun against them by attachment of
property, unless they filed a bond to tqe value of the property, was
119 The statutes authorizing suits against the government are reviewed
in United States v. Pfitsch, note I8, sitpra. In 8 CALIF. L. Ri;v. 342 is a
note on the corporate entity in government-owned corporations; in I5 ILL.
L. fuv. 399 one On' the liability of the railroads to be sued when under government control. ·
40 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 524 (I92I).
4 1 For notes on questions of jurisdiction over defendants, see 9 CALIF.
L. fuv. 74 on the effect of a general appearance after judgment, in 21
COLU:M. L. fuv. 286 on jurisdiction over debtor by service on agent, in 21
Co1,u:M. L. fuv. 362 on when a foreign corporation is doing business in a
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sustained in Ownbey v. M organ42 against the complaints that it
took property without due process of law, denied the equal protection of the laws and abridged the immunities of citizens of the
United States. The third objection was answered by invoking the
principle that the immunities protected are "only such as owe their
existence to the federal government, its national character, its Constitution, or its laws." The equal-protection complaint was predicated on the fact that foreign corporations might appear and defend
without giving security, but this distinction the court thought reasonable. Respect for age saved the statute under the due process
clause. The provision was descended from the Custom of London,
it had relatives in other states in times past, it belonged to "a time
honored method of procedure" and was a "time-honored requirement of security," and the sfate in adopting it had adhered "logically to the ancient distinction between a proceeding quasi in rem
and an action in personam." The general and special considerations
militating against decl<!-ring such a Methuselah an outlaw under the
due-process clause are put by Mr. Justice Pitney as follows :
"The due process clause does not impose upon the states
a duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of
justice, with every modern improvement and with provision
against every possible hardship that may befall. It restrains
state action, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, within
bounds that. are consistent with the fundamentals of individual liberty and private property, including the right to be
heard where liberty or property is at stake in judicial proceedings. But a property owner who absents himself from
the territorial jurisdiction of a state, leaving his property
within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to consent that a
state, and 21 Cor.u:i.r. L. Rsv. 494 on jurisdiction by service on a person
within the state to attend court.
Questions somewhat analogous are considered in Albert Levitt, "The
Domicile of a Married Woman," 91 CEN'l'. L. J. 4 24; Ale."<:. Simpson, Jr.,
"What Constitutes a Voting Residence in Pennsylvania," 69 U. PA. L. Rsv.
l; and notes on the domicil of a married woman in 21 Cor.u:i.r. L. ~- 488
and 30 YALE L. J. 631, and on the power of equity to deal with a res in a
foreign jurisdiction in 30 YALE L. J. 865.
42 256 U.S. 94. 41 Sup. Ct. 433 (1921). See 19 ~lCH. L. ~- 853.
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state may subject such property to judicial process to answer
demands made against him in his absence, according to any
practicable method that reasonably may be adopted. A procedure customarily employed, long before the Revolution, in
the commercial metropolis of England, and generally adopted
by the states as suited to their circumstances and needs, cannot be deemed inconsistent with due process of law, even if
it be taken with its ancient incident of; requiring security
from a defendant who after seizure of his property comes
within the jurisdiction and seeks to interpose a defense. The
condition has a reasonable relation to the conversion of a
proceeding quasi in rem into an action in personani; ordinarily it is not difficult to comply with-a man who has property usually has friends and credit-and hence in its normal
operation it must be regarded as a permissible condition; and
it cannot be deemed so arbitrary as to render the procedure
inconsistent with due process of law when applied to a
defendant who, through exceptional misfortune, is unable to
furnish the necessary security; certainly not where such a
defendant, as is the case now presented, so far as the record
shows, has acquired the property right and absented himself
from the state .after the practice was established, and hence
with notice that his property situate there would be subject
to disposition under foreign attachment by the very method
that afterwards was pursued, and that he would have no right
to enter appearance and make defense except upon giving
security.
"However desirable it is that the old forins of procedure
be improved with the progress of time, it cannot rightly be
said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal
and self-executing remedy. Its function is negative, not
affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures
of reform. For instance, it does not constrain the states to
accept particular modem doctrines of equity, or adopt a
combined system of law and equity pr6cedure, or dispense
with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give
untrammeled liberty to make amendments. Neither does it,
as we think, .require a state to relieve the hardship of an
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ancient and familiar method of procedure by dispensing with
the exaction of special security from an appearing defendant
·in foreign attachment."
Mr. Justice McReynolds confined his concurrence to the result and
Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Clarke dissented.43
One of the objections to the Act of Congress regulating rents in
the District of Columbia was stated and answered by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Block v. Hirsh44 as follows:
"The statute is objected to on the further ground that landlords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury on
the right to possession of the land. If the power of the
commission established by the statute to regulate the relation
is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, this
objection amounts to little. To regulate the relation and to
decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable. While the
act is in force there is little to decide except whether the
rent allowed is reasonable, and upon that question the courts
are given the last word. A part of the exigency is to secure
a speedy and summary administration of the law, and we
are not prepared to say that the suspension of ordinary remedies was not a reasonable provision of a statute reasonable
in its aim and intent." 45
43

The eligibility of women for jury service is considered in I9 MICH.

L. REv. 662, 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 3I8, and 6g U. PA. L. RJ>v. 386; the extent to
which the legislature may regulate judicial procedure, in 34 HARV. L. Riw.
424, 434; the validity of court rules when in opposition to statute, in 5
MINN. L. R.Ev. 73; the power of a provost martial during riots, in I5 Iu,.
L. RJ>v. 469; the relation between civil and military courts, in I5 ILL. L. Riw.
334- In 19 MICH. L. REv. 445 is a discussion of a decision holding that an
allowance for e..'t:penses is not an increase in the compensation of a judge.
44 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (I921), 20 MICH. L. RJ>v. 9, 274.
45 Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. 230 (I92I), interpreting the federal statute disqualifying a judge against whom an affidavit
of personal prejudice and bias is filed, is discussed in 2I Cox.UM. L. RJ>v.
387, 16 ILL. L. RJ>v. I43, 19 MICH. L. RJ>v. 637, 6 VA. L. fuG. n. s. 938, and
7 VA. L. REV. 547. In 6 CORNELL L. Q. II7 is a note on disqualification of a
judge for relationship to attorney; in 34 HARV. L. RJ>v. 2I6 one on disqualification for relationship to party; in 30 YALE L. J. 305 one on disqualification for interest in the cause.
In re Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (I920), 19 MICH. L. RJ>v.
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4. Faith and Credit to Proceedings of Sister States
No cases which technically fall under this head were d~cided
during the past term, but -issues of res adjitdicata involving analogous principles appear in various decisions. Sitpreme Tribe of
Ben Hur v. Cauble 46 held that all members of a class are privies to
a class suit and bound by the decree, since otherwise the "unfortunate situation may result in the determination of the rights of most
of the class by a decree rendered upon a theory which may be
repudiated in another forum as to a part of the same class." Oklahoma v. Texas4 7 held the plaintiff state concluded by a decree in a
former boundary suit brought against the defendant state by the
United States prior to the admission of Oklahoma to statehood.
Privett v. United States4 8 .held the United States not bound by a
decree in a former suit brought by Indians to cancel patents since it was not a formal party and has an interest in the
enforcement of the restrictions against alienation which is distinct
from that of the Indians. Economy Light and Power Co. v. United
States4 9 held the United States not concluded by a decree in a suit
brought by a state to determine whether a river is a navigable
water of the United States. New Orleans Land Co. v. Leader
Realty Co.50 found that a prior decree ordering a sale of land was
not an adjudication in rem and so did not conclude third parties
claiming an interest in the land. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v.
Blincoe51 found that an issue determined by a state court on a
retrial after a prior aecision had been reversed by the Supreme
308, allowing the appointment of an auditor in an action at law in the federal courts, is treated in 20 Cor.uM. L. Rlw. 805; 34 HARV. L. Rev. 32r, 338;
and 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 2g6. Questions of federal procedure are discussed
in Charles C. Moore, "Proposed Bill Regulating Federal Appellate Procedure," 24 LAW NO'l'ES r48; notes on uniform federal procedure, in 20
Cor.uM. L. Rev. 906 and 7 VA. L. RltG. n. s. 48; and notes on the constitutionality of partial new trials on the question of damages only, in 34 HARV.
L. Rev. 7r, 86; 5 MINN. L. Rev. r44; and 69 U. PA. L. Rev. 71.
46 Note 2r, s11pra.
47 Note 28, s11pra.
4 8 256 U. S. -, 4r Sup. Ct. 455 (192r).
4 9 256 U. S. n3, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 (192r), 20 MrcH. L. Rev. r35.
5o 255 U. S. 266, 266, 41 Sup. Ct. 259 (192r).
51 Note 3, s11Pra.
See 30 YAI.e L. J. 765.
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Court was a new issue not previously passed upon by the Supreme
Court and one which depended on state law on which the state
court is the final authority. The case illustrates the distinction
between what is a bar to a subsequent action after a former one has
been finally concluded and what is the law of a case for a retrial. 52

IX.

AnMINIS'l\RA.TIVE PO\VER AND PROCEDURE

Since the principle of the separation of powers is assumed to be
part of the constitutional structure of the national government,
questions of the validity and effect of administrative action concern
constitutional law indii;ectly if not directly. During the past term
of court power exercised by administrative officers. was held to be
within their statutory authority in La Motte v. United States, 53
Stoehr v. Wallace,u 4 United States v. Bowling,05 and Milwaitkee
Publishing Co. v. Burleson,5 6 but beyond the authority delegated
in Payne v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 01 Payne v. Newton, 58 and S1ttton v. United States. 59 Executive interpretation of a treaty was
accorded weight and followed in Sullivan v. Kidd; 60 administrative
52 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 4n, 40 Sup. Ct. 37I (I920), Ig
MICH. L. RJ;v. 3n, holding that a state must give effect to a judgment of
a sister state on a cause of action that could not have been sued on in the
second state, is treated in 3 ILL. L. BULL. 68. For discussions of the full
faith and credit clause see Mayer C. Brown, "The Validity of a Michigan
Divorce Decree in Foreign States and Foreign Countries," 4 B1-MoNTH.
L. fuv., No. 5, page 36; John T. Richards, "The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce," 15 ILL.
L. fuv. 259; and notes on the recognition of foreign divorce decrees in 2I
Coum. L. Riw. g8 and 6 CORNELL L. Q. 323. Questions of conflict of laws
are treated in notes in 21 CoLUM. L. fuv. 366 on statutes of limitations, in
2I COLUM. L. RJ;v. 585 on usury, in 21 CoLUM. L. fuv. on foreign recording
acts after removal of chattels, in 34 HARV. L. RJ;v. 553 on the recognition
of foreign judgments, in 19 MICH. L. REv. 220 on suits by foreign e.xecutors,
in 19 MICH. L. R.l;v. 344 on statutes disinheriting an heir who kills his ancestor, and in 30 YALE L. J. 860 on foreign judgments in interpleader.
53 254 U. S. 570, 41 Sup. Ct. 204 ( r92I), 20 MICH. L. fuv. II.
54 255 U.S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. 293 (I92I), 20 MrcH. L. fuv. 5.
55 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 561 (I92I).
56 255 U. S. 407, 4I Sup. Ct. 352 ( I92I), 20 MICH. L. fuv. 6.
67
255 U. S. 228, 41 Sup. Ct. 3I4 (I92I).
58 255 U. S. 438, 4I Sup. Ct. 368 (I92I).
59 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 563 (I92I).
60
254 U. S. 433, 4I Sup. Ct. I58 (I92I).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

construction of statutes was held persuasive and adopted in Blanset
v. Cardin, 61 McLaren v. Fleischer, 62 ,and Culpepper v. Ocheltree,63
but rejected as erroneous in Payne v. N ewton64 and Payne v. Central Pacific Ry. Co.65 Administrative findings were accorded respect
and accepted in Edward Rutledge Timber Co. v. Farrell, 66 Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Bitrleson,61 and Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.
v. United States. 68 Failure of administrative authorities to take
action was held a bar to the desires of petitioners in Economy Light
& Power Co. v. United States,6° Chase, Jr., v. United States,10 and
Gilpin v. United States,11 but not in Wyoming v. United States12
and Payne v. New M e.xico.13 An administrative construction of a
statute was held in Hall v. Payne14 not to be arbitrary or capricious
and therefore to be not subject to control by mandamus. Whether
it might be rejected in proper proceedings was neither denied nor
affirmed.
A constitutional issue as to the adequacy of administrative procedure was raised in Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson,15 which
held that due process was satisfied by the hearing accorded to the
publisher of a newspaper before an assistant postmaster general in
which there was full opportunity to urge that the paper was not
guilty of utterances warranting a revocation of its second-Class
mailing privilege. In reviewing the conclusion reached, the court
proceeded upon the principle that it must stand unless the court is
clearly convinced that it is wrong. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in dissenting, raised constitutional objections to the power exercised and
U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 519 (1921).
256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 577 (1921).
63 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 579 (1921).
6 4 Note 58, supra.
65 Note 57, supra.
66 255 U. S. 268, 41 Sup. Ct. 328 ( 1921).
67 Note 56, snpra.
68 254 U.S. 57, 41 Sup. Ct. 24 (1921).
69 256 U.S. n3, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 (1921), 20 MICH. L.
10 256 U, S, 1, 41 Sup. Ct. 417 (1921).
71 256 U. S. 10, 41 Sup. Ct. 419 (1921).
12 255 U. S. 489, 41 Sup. Ct. 393 (1921).
73 255 U.S. 367, 41 Sup. Ct. 333 (1921).
74 254 U. S. 343, 41 Sup. Ct. 131 (1920).
1 5 Note 56, supra. See 21 Cor.u:r.r. L. ~v. 715.
61 256

62

~v.

135.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN

1920-1921

489

the action taken, but did not contend that the administrative procedure was inadequate if administrative action was fitting. Questions of administrative procedure in the assessment of state taxes
were passed upon in Turner v. Wade 76 and St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co. v. Middlekamp,7 7 already considered in the "section on
taxation. 78
Some question as to the power of a state to delegate to a board
discretion to direct the removal of grade crossings was raised in
Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,1° but Mr.
Justice Holmes answered:
"The state courts seem to regard the words as imposing
a positive duty, but upon either construction we perceive no
infraction of the. company's constitutional rights. If the
words are imperative the reasons that we have given ·apply.
If they leave a discretion it is subject to review by the courts,
and this court has no concern with the question how far
legislative or quasi-legislative powers may be delegated to a
commission or board."
Examples of the delegation of power to state administrative authorities appear in Johnson v. Maryland, 80 Nicchia v. New York, 81
Thornton v. Duffy, 82 Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board, 83
Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 84 already
reviewed, and also in many of the cases involving the regulation
of public utilities. The administrative power sustained in Block v.
Hirsh85 was to modify the terms of existing leases which condiU. S. 64, 4I Sup. Ct. 27 (I920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I62.
256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 489 (IgzI), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I62.
7 s Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 42I, 40 Sup. Ct. 572
( I920), 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 23, 3I6, is discussed in 20 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 8o6 and
6 CoRNtr.L L. Q. 320; Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 40 Sup. Ct.
4Io (I920), 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 3I9, in 9 CALIF. L. Rsv. 433. An English decision on hearing in deportation cases is noted in 30 YALt L. J. ¢.
79 254 U. S. 394, 4I Sup. Ct. I69 (I921), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 283, 286.
so 254 U. S. 51, 4I Sup. Ct. I6 (1920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 265.
81 254 U. S. 228, 4I Sup. Ct. 103 (I920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I70, 265.
82 254 U. S. 36I, 4I Sup. Ct. 137 (1920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 267.
83 255 U. S. i44 4I Sup. Ct. 252 (1921), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 269.
84 255 U. S. 445, 41 Sup. Ct. 373 (I921), 20 MtcH. L. Rsv. 271.
ss Note 44 supra.
·
76 254

77
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tion the rights of tenants to continue occupancy. The constitutionality of the delegation was affirmed as an incident to the general
power to regulate the relation between landlord and tenant. Questions of statutory construction as to the method of securing judicial review of commission action are considered in Vandalia R. Co.
v. Schnull86 and Hollis v. Kutz. 81 In re State of New York (The
Queen City) 88 accepts the suggestion of the attorney general of the
state that a ship belongs to the state as a proper mode of presenting
the issue to the court.89
A few stray adjudications on matters relating to the administration of the national government may be mentioned. Krichman v.
United States9° holds that a baggage porter on a railroad under federal control is not an officer of the United States within the meaning of~ statute punishing bribery of officers. 91 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Poston,9 2 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. A.ult,9 3 and Norfolk-Sou-them R. Co. v. Owen94 reaffirm the principle that the
86

255 U. S. u3, 41 Sup. Ct. 324 (r92I), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 279.
255 U. S. 452, 41 'Sup. Ct. 371 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 282.
88 Note 32, supra.
89 Questions of administrative law are considered in Walter Carrington,
"Delegation of Power to Boards and Commissions," 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. Sor;
Laurence Curtis, 2d, "Judicial Review of Commission," 34 HARV. L. R.Ev.
862; Nathan Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 YAI.E
L. J. 781; and notes in 6 CORNELL L. Q. 325 on injunction against referendum
election; in 15 Ir,L. L. R.Ev. 400 and 19 MICH. L. REv. 2rr on delegating to
fire marshal power to designate dangerous buildings; in 15 Ir,r,. L. R.Ev. 223
on delegation of judicial power; in 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 2I3 on making state
medical association the state board of health; in 19 MrcH. L. REV. 648 on
giving to· police commissioner control of licensing private detectives; in 19
MrcH. L. R.Ev. 640 on arbitrary power to revoke licenses to sell soft drinks;
in 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 56g on finality of administrative determinations under
Torrens land system; in 6g U. PA. L. R.Ev. 152 on conclusiveness of a sheriffs return; and in 27 W. VA. L. Q. 84, 92, on judicial control of administrative judgment as to the validity of bonds.
90 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 514 · ( r92r).
91 The question whether an inspector of the Fleet Corporation is an officer
of the United States is considered in 21 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 485; the personal
liability of a justice of the peace for his official neglects in 34 HARV. L. R.Ev.
219, 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 482, and 7 VA. L. R.Ev. 558.
02 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 598 (1921).
93 Note 38, sitPra.
9 4 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 597 (1921).
87
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United States cannot be sued without its consent.95 In United States
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. 96 it is affirmed that laches may deprive
the United States of the privilege of invoking the equitable principle suspending the statute of limitations in actions for fraud until
the fraud is discovered. It was held, however, that there was no·
]aches where the fraud was clandestine. Harris v. District of
Col1tnibia91 holds that a municipal corporation is immune from liability for injuries caused by the fault of employees engaged in
sweeping the streets.98

X.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Several cases presented the question whether state police measures were unconstitutional interferences with the exercise of the
95 The consent of the United States to be sued is considered in Judson
A. Crane, "Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims," 34 HARV.
L. R.Ev. I6I.
96 2ss U. S. 323, 4I Sup. Ct. 33S ( I92I).
9 12s6 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 6Io (I92I).
9 s The tort liability of municipal corporations is considered in notes in
20 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 772; 6 CoRNELI. L. Q. 207; 34 HARv. L. R.Ev. 66, 9I; I9
MICH. L. R.Ev. s69, 7S8; S MINN. L. R.Ev. 326; 7 VA. L. R.Ev. 383, s62; 27 W.
VA. L. Q. 94; and 30 YAr.S L. J. 87, 303, 42s.
For other discussions of the law of municipal corporations, see 9 CAI.IF.
L. R.Ev. I6I, I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 3S2, and 30 YAI.S L. J. 304 on power to act
beyond boundaries; 20 Cor.m.r. L. R.Ev. 799 on proper park purposes; 2I
Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 99 on use of streets for private purposes; 2I Cor.uM. L. Rev.
490 on acquisition of highway by prescription; 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 439 on
liability for services under void contract; 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 439 on power
to authorize nuisances in streets; I6 Ir.r.. L. R.Ev. I30 on vacation of streets;
I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. S70 on letting contracts to lowest bidder; I9 MICH. L. R.Ev.
7S7 on power to act as trustee; I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 884 on implied powers and
ultra vires; S MINN. L. R.Ev. ISI on whether paving law is an uniform law;
30 YAI.E L. J. 302 on liability to garnishment; and 30 YAI.E L. J. 420 on
estoppel against a municipality.
For want of a better place, mention may here be made of William Anderson, "The Constitution of Minnesota,'' S MINN. L. R.Ev. 407; W. L. Jenks,
"History of Michigan Constitutional Provision Prohibiting a General Revision of the Laws,'' I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 6IS; Willard L. King, "Draftsmanship
of the [Illinois] Constitution of I870,'' IS Ir.r.. L. R.Ev. 447; Urban A. Lavery,
"Revising a Constitution,'' IS !Lr.. L. R.Ev. 437; Leonard D. White, "The New
Hampshire Constitutional Convention," I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 383; and a note in
2I Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. I82 on proportional representation.
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powers of the national government. Johnson v. Maryland 99 held
that a state may not require the driver of a mail truck to pass a
test to determine his qualifications. It is the duty of the post office
department to employ competent persons, declared Mr. Justice
B:olmes, and it must be .presumed that this duty has been performed.
vVhile the states may incidentally affect the action of drivers of
mail wagons as by regulating the mode of turning corners, it cannot go so far as to dictate the selection of employees of the United
States government. State efforts to interrupt the acts of the federal government itself are subject to greater limitations than are
efforts to regulate persons employed in interstate commerce, so that
what may be held to affect interstate commerce only indirectly or
incidentally will be regarded as a direct and unconstitutional interference with the federal government when applied to the execution
of federal functions. Justices Pitney and McReynolds dissented.
In Gilbert v. Minnesota100 the majority of the court found no
interference with the federal government in a state law forbidding
persons to teach that citizens should not enlist in the army or navy
or should not assist the United States in time of war. Mr. Justice
McKenna found the statute one in aid of the national government
and not a hindrance to the execution of its powers and its policies.
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that the state statute
was not confined to time of war and insisted that it might be the
policy of the national government to have military and naval forces
composed of volunteers who had enlisted after full consideration
, . of the arguments against such participation. With such freedom
of consideration the state statute would interfere. It also went
beyond congressional legislation in prohibiting the teaching of doctrine, while Congress had confined its prohibitions to tangible
obstructions. The state law might well promote disaffection which
Congress sought to avoid by less drastic regulation. Congress by
failure to impose prohibitions indicated its will that the action of
the citizen should be untrammelled. Chief Justice White in a brief
separate dissent expressed the opinion that "the subject matter is
99

254 U. -S. SI, 4I Sup. Ct. I6 ( I920), 20 MICH. L. REv. 265. See 2I
L. REv. 93, 34 HARV. L. REv. 434, 7 VA. L. REv. 3u, and 30 YALt

CoLUl\£.

L.J.426.
100

.

.

254 U. S. 325, 4I Sup. Ct. I25 ( I920), 20 MICH. L. REv. IO, 265.
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within the exclusive legislative power of Congress, when exerted,
and that the action of Congress has covered the whole field."
A state law regulating the sale of habit-forming drugs was sustained in Whipple v. Martinson 101 as against the objection that it
interfered with the enforcement of the federal statute imposing a
tax on prescribers and dispensers of such drugs. The state law forbade certain acts which the prohibitory provisions of the federal
law did not forbid, provided records were kept of them, but this
difference was held to impose an impediment to the enforcement of
the federal law. Mr. Justice Day recognized the validity of the
principle relied on by the drug dispenser, but found no ground for
its application to the statute before the court.
Several cases involved the applicability of state power to the
railroads while under federal control. Congress had permitted the
continued application of state police measures and state tax laws.
An objection to a state franchise tax was held unfounded in St.
Louis-Sa1i Francisco Ry. Co. v. Middlekanip. 102 That the congressional consent to apply the police laws of the state does not extend
to laws imposing penalties for delay in paying wages was held in
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault103 and Norfolk-Southern R. Co. v.
Owens,104 and it was declared to be a question of federal and not
of state law whether an imposition is penal or compensatory. The
companies were held not liable on common law principles, since
after the assumption of federal control the defaults complained of
were not their defaults. The lack of power to enforce state laws
not sanctioned by Congress was predicated upon the impossibility
of suing the United States government without its consent. So
also in "fVestern Union Telegraph Co. v. Poston,1° 0 Mr. Justice Brandeis declared that the common-law immunity of the telegraph companies for acts and omissions of. the government is not affected by
the fact that it may be impossible to sue the government, and that
"if Congress has omitted to provide adequately for the protection
of rights of the public, Congress alone can provide the remedy."
U. S. 41, 41 Sup. Ct. 425 ( 1921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 158.
256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 489 (1921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. I62.
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103 Note 8, supra.
104256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 597 (I921).
1o5 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 598 ( 1921).
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The doctrine that a receiver appointed by a federal court takes
subject to all prior liens was invoked in Marshall ·v. New York 106
for the decision that the common-law priority lien of a state for
unpaid taxes may be enforced against property in the custody of a
federal receiver. A state requirement that an international bridge
be altered to provide additional accommodations was held in International Bridge Co. v. New York 101 to be unimpeded by the fact
that part of the land under the bridge had been conveyed to the
United States, when the purpose of the conveyance was uncon~
nected with the administration of the government.
State taxation of banks chartered by the federal government was
declared unconstitutional in two cases. In Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co.108 Mr. Justice Day, 1n affirming the power of
Congress to exempt from state taxation the capital, surplus, income
and mortgages of federal land banks and joint-stock land banks,
referred to previous declarations "that the states were wholly with·
out power to levy any tax directly or indirectly upon national banks,
their property, assets or franchises, except so far as the permissive
legislation of Congress allowed such taxation." This principle was
the basis of the decision in Merchants National Bank of Richmond
v. Richmond, 109 which held that a state could not impose a higher
rate on national bank stock than on money loaned at interest by
individuals, since Congress had qualified its permission to tax bank
stock by the provision that the tax should not be "at a greater rate
than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state" and money loaned at interest is one
kind of moneyed capital which Congress had in mind by "other
moneyed capital." 110
One of the grounds of resistance to a special assessment in Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey111 was tha1l the complaining railroad
was an instrumentality of the federal government for developing
Indian coal lands ; but Mr. J ust~ce Brandeis answered that "the mere
Note 7, supra.
U. S. I26, 4I Sup. Ct. 56 (I920), 20 MICH. L. R.i>v. I4I, 285.
108 Note I3, supra.
109 256 U. S. -. 4I Sup. Ct. 6!9 (I921), 20 MICH. L. R.i>v. I72.
110 An analogous issue is considered in Montgomery B. Angell, "State
Usury Laws and the Federal Reserve Banks," 7 VA. L. Rl>v. 536.
111 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 582 (192I), 20 MICH. L. R.i>v. 16g.
1 0s
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fact that property is used, among others, by the United States as
an instrument for effecting its purpose does not relieve it from state
taxation."
Turning to federal powers alleged to interfere unconstitutionally
with state functions, New York Trust Co. v. Eisner112 holds that
the federal estates tax does not interfere with the power of the
states to regulate descent and distribution. It had been held that
no such interference was wrought by a federal legacy tax, but it
was here argued that the estates tax is different since it "is cast
upon a transfer while it is being effectuated by the state itself and
therefore is an intrusion upon its processes." To this Mr. Justice
Holmes answered that "if a tax on the property distributed by the
laws of the state, determined by the fact that distribution has been
accomplished, is valid, a tax determined by the fact that distributio~
is about to begin is no greater interference and is equally good." 113
That the federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit
against a state is established by the Eleventh Amendment and by
inference drawn therefrom as to suits not expressly within its terms.
The principle is applied to suits otherwise within the admiralty
jurisdiction in In re State of New York (Petition of Walsh) 114
as to an action i1i personam, and in In re State of New York (The
Queen City) 115 as to an action in rent. 116
Relations between states were involved in suits to which states
were parties. New York v. New I ersey117 held that a state may
enjoin a neighboring state from polluting intervening waters by
sewage, but found the alleged pollution not established. 0 klahoma
v. Texas118 held the plaintiff state concluded by the determination
of a boundary in a prior suit between the defendant and the United
U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (1g.z1), 20 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 155.
Federal taxation of income from state bonds is considered in Alexander M. Hamburg, "Exemption of State and Municipal Securities from
Federal Income Taxation," 7 VA, L. R.Ev. 195; Harry Hubbard, "From
'Whatever Source Derived,'' 6 A. B. A. JouR. 203; and a note in 7 VA. L.
R1w. 136.
114 Note 24, supra.
110 Note 25, szipra.
116 The power of the federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of judgments obtained in state courts is considered in 15 ILL. L. R.Ev. 466.
111 Note 27, supra.
11s Note 28, supra.
112 256
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States before the plaintiff was a state. Another part of the controversy still remained open, and in this various orders were issued
in Oklahoma v. Texas. 119 A report of commissioners locating a
boundary in accord with an earlier decree was confirmed in Arkansas
v. Mississippi. 120
Columbia University.
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Note 29, supra.
Note 30, supra.

